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Using estimates from the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, the World Health Organization, and pub-
lished models of the expected evolution of pandemic inﬂ  uen-
za, we modeled the surge capacity of healthcare facility and 
intensive care unit (ICU) requirements over time in northern 
Netherlands (≈1.7 million population). We compared the de-
mands of various scenarios with estimates of maximum ICU 
capacity, factoring in healthcare worker absenteeism as well 
as reported and realistic estimates derived from semistruc-
tured telephone interviews with key management in ICUs in 
the study area. We show that even during the peak of the 
pandemic, most patients requiring ICU admission may be 
served, even those who have non–inﬂ  uenza-related condi-
tions, provided that strong indications and decision-making 
rules are maintained for admission as well as for continua-
tion (or discontinuation) of life support. Such a model should 
be integral to a preparedness plan for a pandemic with a 
new human-transmissible agent. 
T
he threat of an avian inﬂ  uenza A (e.g., subtypes H5N1, 
H7N7) pandemic has forced healthcare authorities 
and health services to draft and discuss preparedness plans 
(1–5). The responsibility for management of the national 
and regional risks due to pandemic inﬂ  uenza was under-
scored by the outbreak of avian inﬂ  uenza (H7N7) in 2003 
in the Netherlands, which led to culling one third of domes-
tic poultry (including 30 million chickens), with 1 human 
casualty, a veterinary surgeon who died from acute lung 
injury after infection with the virus (6,7). The increasing 
pandemic threat of inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) is reﬂ  ected by 291 
cases of human disease reported to the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) as of April 11, 2007, with 172 human 
deaths (8). Because the question is not whether a pandemic 
will occur but, rather, when (9), policymakers have been 
urged to take action in preparedness planning.
Preparing for an inﬂ  uenza pandemic is difﬁ  cult for 
healthcare systems because of many uncertainties. Strik-
ingly little knowledge has been obtained from the scattered 
cases of avian inﬂ  uenza in humans (10).
In inﬂ  uenza patients admitted to an intensive care unit 
(ICU), severe disease may develop with a sepsis-like pat-
tern with a proinﬂ  ammatory cytokine storm (11), but it is 
unknown what percentage of patients fall ill after acquiring 
the virus (attack rate) and what percentage require hospital 
admission and, subsequently, ICU admission. Attack rate, 
hospital and ICU length of stay, and death rate can only 
accurately be factored in after a new virus has emerged 
(3). Therefore, almost all assumptions in the models pub-
lished to date have drawn on the knowledge obtained from 
the large 20th-century pandemics (12–14). In summary, a 
model for preparedness of the healthcare system should be 
highly adaptable and ﬂ  exible to factor in new information 
emerging in the early stages of the pandemic.
The University Medical Center Groningen (UMCG) is 
a large tertiary care university hospital covering ≈12% of 
the total Dutch population and ≈30% of the total surface 
area of the Netherlands. Under Dutch law, UMCG has an 
important role in the event of an avian inﬂ  uenza pandemic, 
not only for the patient population that it serves but also as 
a regional coordinating center (15). Training courses that 
emphasized the need to enhance collaboration and com-
munication for pandemic inﬂ  uenza were held with regional 
and municipal health authorities, general practitioners, 
and representatives of all hospitals in the northern region. 
We present a model, similar to models by Anderson et al. 
(16) for Australia and New Zealand and Menon et al. for 
England (14). We show that increased hospitalization in 
combination with healthcare worker (HCW) absenteeism 
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will have a substantial, but in our model manageable, ef-
fect on hospital and ICU bed occupancy. Furthermore, we 
discuss the choices to be made for ongoing, non–inﬂ  uenza-
related emergencies during an inﬂ  uenza pandemic and the 
effect of enhancing the contingency plans already in place. 
Although surge capacity of hospital resources is typically 
limited (1), we explored whether, under speciﬁ  ed assump-
tions and appropriate planning and training, a pandemic is 
manageable.
Methods
We used FluSurge 2.0 (17) and a computer model in 
an Excel ﬁ  le developed by one of the authors to calculate 
the impact of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic in the Netherlands on 
hospital admission and occupancy rate of all ICU beds (i.e., 
those with facilities for mechanical ventilation). Data on 
population (≈1.7 million) and age distribution (Table 1) 
were obtained from publicly available sources. The age 
distribution in the Dutch population data were provided in 
5-year groupings, and we therefore converted these data to 
an even distribution to allow for calculations with the Flu-
Surge program (14). Data on total hospital beds, ICU beds, 
and number of nurses and their full-time equivalents were 
obtained from publicly available sources (18). ICU capaci-
ty was also obtained from reports from hospital administra-
tors during training sessions for pandemic inﬂ  uenza in May 
2006, organized by the public health authorities in the re-
gion. These data on reported ICU capacity were discussed 
during a semistructured telephone interview with ICU medi-
cal staff in August 2006. Using these data, we estimated the 
regular bed capacity and maximal surge capacity. Data on 
the impact of a pandemic inﬂ  uenza on healthcare services 
were adopted from the National Institute for Public Health 
and the Environment (RIVM) (19,20). RIVM presented 
tables for 25% and 50% disease attack rates, representing 
best and worst case scenarios. From these tables we cal-
culated the 30% attack rate (percentage of the population 
that becomes ill) by linear transformation. A 30% attack 
rate is the most likely scenario, according to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, and is deﬁ  ned as the most 
likely scenario by RIVM. 
We also calculated, within the model, the total number 
of patients admitted to the hospitals at each point in time 
during the pandemic. We deﬁ  ned the ﬁ  rst day (day 0) as 
the moment that WHO declares human-to-human transmis-
sion (phase IV or V in the current WHO phase of pandemic 
alert). We took into account the time each patient occupies 
a hospital or ICU bed (range 8–15 days), on the basis of 
experience with patients admitted to ICU with a diagnosis 
of pneumonia or sepsis. Finally, we incorporated estimated 
risk of death per patient, reducing the number of admitted 
patients at any one time. Because the data of the RIVM 
are in week blocks, we evenly distributed the number of 
hospital admissions and the proportion of deaths across the 
week days.
In our calculations, we also factored the effect of treat-
ment (within 48 hours of infection) with antiviral medica-
tion on the spread and the impact of the pandemic, although 
the exact effect size is still uncertain (14,21). Antiviral 
medication is assumed to reduce the total number of hospi-
tal admissions by 50% and death rate by ≈30%.
In addition, we incorporated in the model the probable 
absenteeism of HCWs either due to illness or to care duties 
at home or in individual social environments. We assumed 
that HCWs will become ill at a rate similar to that of the 
general population. We extrapolated national population 
data of illness and deaths to the total number of HCWs in 
our HCW database.
Finally, we incorporated the effect of strict treatment 
decisions at the patient level on the peak occupancy rate of 
ICU beds. We applied a 48-hour restriction of treatment 
time at the ICU for patients occupying an ICU bed. We 
focused our preparedness plan on adults, assuming an out-
break pattern similar to that of Spanish ﬂ  u (22) and severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), in which adolescents 
and adults accounted for most cases. 
Results
We present the impact of a pandemic with new hu-
man-transmissible inﬂ  uenza on hospital resources in the 
northern part of the Netherlands. Using the ﬁ  gures of the 
RIVM, and assuming a 30% cumulative disease attack rate, 
we estimated that ≈12% of the population will consult a 
general practitioner (Table 2). The percentage of persons 
triaged for hospital admission is 0.3%. We assumed excess 
deaths among these selected patients, some 50% of whom 
may require mechanical ventilation (Figure 1). In the north-
ern part of the Netherlands 5,629 regular hospital beds are 
available. The hospitals in this region have a total of 30% 
(non–inﬂ   uenza-related) acute care, which would leave 
3,940 regular hospital beds that could be made available 
for inﬂ  uenza-related hospital admissions. If the attack rate 
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Table 1. Age distribution of inhabitants of 3 northern provinces in the study, the Netherlands 
Age range, y 
Province 0–15 16–24 25–44 45–64 >65 Total, all ages 
Groningen 99,065 72,714 164,371 151,590 86,818 574,558
Friesland 125,174 70,397 174,768 172,600 99,665 642,604
Drenthe 92,241 45,885 127,674 136,915 81,212 483,927
Total 316,480 188,996 466,813 461,105 267,695 1,701,089RESEARCH
reaches a maximum of 50% with a mean length of stay of 
15 hospital days per patient, without any intervention, this 
would lead to a peak of 1,227 occupied regular hospital 
beds, which would sufﬁ  ce for inﬂ  uenza-related acute care. 
Therefore, we centered our calculations around the peak 
occupancy of intensive care beds. We calculated the num-
ber of hospital admissions per week, spread evenly across 7 
days in the respective week, and we subtracted the number 
of deaths, also evenly spread across the week. We assumed 
that 25%–50% of total hospital admission patients would 
require some form of mechanical ventilator support, and 
we provide calculations for the extremes of our estimates. 
On the basis of results from a semistructured telephone in-
terview with ICU medical staff of the hospitals in the 3 
northern provinces, a maximum of 136 (of a total of 200) 
ICU beds could be dedicated to inﬂ  uenza-related acute-
care patients. We estimate that 90 ICU beds will be made 
available in a short period. In the scenario of no additional 
intervention, if the full capacity of all 136 ICU beds is used, 
with an attack rate of 30%, 25% ICU admissions, and a 
mean length of stay of 8 days, we would have a shortage 
of 3 ICU beds at day 28 after onset, when we expect the 
pandemic to peak. This shortage in ICU capacity is exac-
erbated with any increase in hospital length of stay or ICU 
length of stay. 
HCWs would become ill in the pandemic in propor-
tion to the attack rate in the general population, and we 
illustrated the impact of HCW absenteeism on loss of ICU 
bed capacity for all presented scenarios (Figures 1, 2). Fur-
thermore, we visualized the effect of intensiﬁ  ed treatment 
decisions on the occupancy of ICU beds (Figure 2). For 
this situation, we used the representative case scenario es-
timate data, i.e., 30% attack rate and a mean length of stay 
of 8 days, and show the effect of intensiﬁ  ed treatment deci-
sion resulting in reduction of ICU occupancy by 5% and 
20%. Intensiﬁ  ed treatment decision was deﬁ  ned as discon-
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Table 2. Avian influenza impact for 3 northern provinces in the study, the Netherlands* 
Week Days  No. patients  General practitioner consultations Hospital admissions  Deaths
0 1–7 0 0 0 0
1 8–14 105 11 0 0
2 15–21 4,694 515 11 0
3 22–28 145,898 16,559 315 84
4 29–35 347,288 44,699 977 420
5 36–42 25,935 3,696 95 74
6 43–49 578 84 0 0
7 50–56 11 0 0 0
8 57–63 0 0 0 0
9 64–70 0 0 0 0
Total 524,507 65,562 1,397 578
*30% attack rate, pandemic period 9 weeks.  
Figure 1. A) 30% attack rate and mean length of stay of 8 days without antiviral medication, pandemic period 9 weeks; B) 30% attack 
rate and mean length of stay of 8 days with antiviral medication, pandemic period 14 weeks; C) 30% attack rate and mean length of stay 
of 15 days without antiviral medication, pandemic period 9 weeks; D) 30% attack rate and mean length of stay of 15 days with antiviral 
medication, pandemic period 14 weeks. Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza and Hospital Resources
tinuation of mechanical ventilation after 48 hours, based 
on ample consultations within ICU teams and with part-
ners and next of kin of patients that the patients are deemed 
to have no realistic hope for recovery. Finally, we made 
sensitivity analyses, with changing assumptions within the 
model; this additional material is presented in an online 
Technical Appendix (available from www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/13/11/1714-Techapp.pdf).
Discussion
We provide calculations for hospital bed and ICU 
capacity for an inﬂ  uenza pandemic made for 1 region 
in the Netherlands showing that even during the peak of 
the pandemic, hospital facilities can continue to provide 
adequate healthcare service to the public. As a novel el-
ement we include calculations for HCW absenteeism. 
We have not considered potential erosion of profession-
alism with increased absenteeism due to fear and panic 
among staff or due to staff members’ caring for sick 
family members. Although morale was high during the 
SARS outbreak in Singapore and Toronto (23), some ex-
amples of strained professional behavior have been re-
ported (24). We believe that erosion of professionalism 
and morale may be partly preventable by implementing 
effective protection for HCWs (25,26), with appropriate 
training to comply with protocols for personal protec-
tion. For a new pandemic, the important issues to fac-
tor in are magnitude and duration, calculation of staff 
shortages, and the limited capacity to call in external 
resources.
We show that an inﬂ  uenza pandemic can be managed, 
even allowing emergency care for non–inﬂ  uenza-related 
acute cases, especially when ﬁ  rm decision-making rules 
are followed and antiviral therapy is used. Without with-
drawing or withholding life support to those deemed to 
have no realistic chance of survival, the system is bound to 
collapse (Figure 2). With appropriate patient management, 
however, adequate healthcare can be provided even during 
the peak of the pandemic. We recognize the ethical impact 
this has on the clinicians and nurses who have to make 
these decisions. Many clinicians now realize that end-of-
life decisions are an integral part of healthcare (27) and can 
be considered independent of any speciﬁ  c religious back-
ground or culture (28). ICU staff in the Netherlands have 
been trained to take charge of decision processes about 
foregoing life support in the ICU (27). They are aware of 
potential difﬁ  culties in communicating with members of 
the ICU team, including medical, nursing, and technical 
staff in decisions at the end of life. The challenge during 
an outbreak of pandemic inﬂ  uenza will be in orchestrating 
and implementing these decisions under extreme time pres-
sure. Relatives of patients as well as team members may 
need more time than available to accept that some patients 
on life support who are not responding to treatment will 
not recover. Some may insist on continuation of support, 
although it would be unwise and possibly disrespectful to 
these patients to continue futile treatment and unfair to oth-
ers who might have been saved if those resources had been 
available. A generous and time-consuming approach may 
not apply under the anticipated extreme conditions of pan-
demic inﬂ  uenza (27).
Decision-making rules have to be adapted to real-time 
information updates obtained during the course of the pan-
demic, and brieﬁ  ngs and exchange of information through-
out the pandemic crisis are pivotal. Existing guidelines and 
protocols such as the Pneumonia Severity Index or its mod-
iﬁ  cation recommended by the American Thoracic Society 
or the British CURB-65, propagated by the British Tho-
racic Society, may not apply fully but can be used initially 
to guide management of patient treatment (29). Our overall 
assessment that an inﬂ  uenza pandemic with assumptions 
described here can be managed at the level of healthcare 
institutions clearly contrasts with the sobering and daunting 
analysis presented for ICU capacity in the United Kingdom 
or Australasia (14,16).
There are limitations to our analysis. We based our 
model on incomplete and sometimes conﬂ  icting or incon-
sistent information on the impact of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic. 
We assume that more reliable data will only become avail-
able when the pandemic is in progress. The effect of antivi-
ral medications, vaccination campaigns, and, for instance, 
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Figure 2. A) Effect of intensiﬁ  ed treatment decision (25% intensive 
care unit [ICU] admission rate, mean length of stay of 8 days) 
without antiviral medication, pandemic period 9 weeks; B) effect 
of intensiﬁ  ed treatment decision (50% ICU admission rate, mean 
length of stay of 8 days) without antiviral medication, pandemic 
period 9 weeks. RESEARCH
closure of schools and airports may alter the key charac-
teristics of the pandemic, all having the effect that onset is 
delayed and that the course is more protracted, with a much 
lower peak (12). Even a less-than-perfect vaccine might 
have a tremendous impact on the course of the pandemic. 
Stockpiling of inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) virus is now being con-
sidered in order to produce vast quantities of vaccine de-
spite the limited protection capacity against the new virus.
The need for surge capacity of hospital resources is 
more dependent on the combination of excess hospital ad-
missions and length of stay than on the mere number of 
hospital admissions. In the Netherlands, stockpiling of 
oseltamivir has been implemented, both for the public at 
large and for healthcare facilities and HCWs working on 
the frontlines during the inﬂ   uenza pandemic. Stockpil-
ing of antimicrobial agents to combat secondary bacterial 
pneumonia is yet another important logistic challenge (30).
The small percentage of patients admitted to hospital in our 
model (based on past experiences) implies that relatively 
small increases in admittance rate will have a huge impact 
on hospital resources requirement.
Extensive exposure may lead to seroconversion to 
avian inﬂ  uenza viruses, as has been shown for inﬂ  uenza A 
(H11N9) virus among waterfowl hunters and wildlife profes-
sionals (31). The policy in the Netherlands since this was dis-
covered has been that all persons involved in culling should 
wear respiratory masks, gowns, gloves, and eye protection. 
Although the effectiveness of these precautions has not been 
prospectively tested, they might protect persons from con-
tracting respiratory viral disease. In our hospital protocol 
for management of patients of new pandemic inﬂ  uenza and 
of other high-risk respiratory pathogens, we have included 
extensive measures to separate these patients from other pa-
tients and focus on the protection of staff (1). Adherence to 
similar protocols has been shown to protect HCWs caring for 
patients with SARS (26). In summary, we recommend using 
and updating the model presented here, or similar models, as 
an integral part of a preparedness plan and as a management 
tool for contingency of pandemic inﬂ  uenza.
Mr Nap is pursuing a PhD degree in hospital and intensive 
care capacity planning, including infectious diseases surge capac-
ity planning. His interests include infectious diseases epidemiol-
ogy, disasters, and application of mathematical modeling to hos-
pital and intensive care resource planning.
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